Abstract. The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation (for short, CTE). The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler's explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.
Introduction
Since the mid-2000s, a consensus (or the closest one gets to a consensus in philosophy) has emerged in the literature on the scientific explanations, according to which there are causal and non-causal scientific explanations. I call this claim the 'liberal consensus'. The liberal consensus has two sources: first, it rests on well-known examples of causal explanations in the natural and social sciences, including detailed mechanistic explanations, especially in the life sciences (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer et al. 2000) , and less detailed 'higher-level' or 'macro' causal explanations (Cartwright 1989; Woodward 2003) . Second, the liberal consensus also gains support from compelling examples of non-causal explanations. Such examples include different kinds of 1 This dialectic situation leaves us with the task to come up with a theoretical response to the liberal consensus. In this paper, I will defend one possible (and particularly attractive) strategy for dealing with the liberal consensus: monism -more precisely, I will defend one specific monist approach to explanation, a counterfactual theory of explanation. I take monism to be the view that there is one single philosophical account capturing both causal and non-causal explanations. A monist holds that causal and non-causal explanations share a feature that makes them explanatory. Hempel's covering-law account is an instructive historical example for illustrating monism. Hempel argued that 1 If causal accounts are taken to be general accounts of scientific explanation, then the existence of non-causal explanations is a direct challenge. If causal accounts are not taken to be general accounts, then the existence of non-causal explanations rather calls for a complementing account of non-causal explanations.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I introduce the counterfactual theory. In section 3, I argue that the counterfactual theory can be successfully applied to Euler's explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality. 2 One alternative option for dealing with the liberal consensus is the view that seemingly non-causal explanations can ultimately be understood as causal explanations. Lewis (1986) and Skow (2014) have presented the most compelling attempt to spell out this strategy. Lewis and Skow rely on the notion of providing information about the causal history of the explanandum. Their notion of 'causal information' is significantly broader than the notion of 'identifying causes of the explanandum' figuring in the causal accounts I have referred to earlier. For instance, Lewis and Skow hold that one explains causally by merely excluding a possible causal history of some explanandum E, or by stating that E has no cause at all -while other causal accounts would not classify this sort of information as causally explanatory. I cannot enter a discussion of Lewis' and Skow's accounts here. Suffice it to say that I suspect that the notion of causal information is ultimately unhelpful because it is too broad.
The Counterfactual Theory
Is there a monist alternative to Hempel's troubled monism? It is fruitful to take a suggestion of Peter Lipton's as a stepping-stone for developing such a monist account. Having presented several examples of non-causal explanations, Lipton outlines a monist strategy for dealing with (what I call) the liberal consensus:
"One reaction to this would be to attempt to expand the notion of causation to some broader notion of 'determination' that would encompass the non-causal cases […] ." (Lipton 2004: 32) However, Lipton is skeptical as to whether one can prevent such a "broader notion of determination" from collapsing into Hempelian monism:
This approach has merit, but it will be difficult to come up with such a notion that we understand even as well as causation, without falling into the relation of deductive determination, which will expose the model to many of the objections to the deductive- Explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual dependence. (Woodward 2003: 191) The CTE is appealing from a monist perspective for two reasons: first, Woodward's (2003: §5.3, §5.8 ) CTE avoids the notorious problems of the covering-law account (see below for a qualification of this claim). Second, although Woodward's version of the CTE -and the underlying interventionist theory of causation -is mainly intended to fit causal explanations, the core idea of the CTE provides a natural way for specifying Lipton's "broader notion of determination". As Woodward suggests himself (but does not elaborate):
[T]he common element in many forms of explanation, both causal and non-causal, is that they must answer what-if-things-had-beendifferent questions. (Woodward 2003: 221) .
Answering "what-if-things-had-been-different questions" amounts to revealing (Woodward 2003: 13) . Or, put it in Lipton's terms, the notion of counterfactual dependence is the broader notion of determination that one "expands" from causal explanations such that it encompasses the non-causal explanations. This CTE-based monism has been explored by Frisch (1998) , Bokulich (2008) , Saatsi and Pexton (2013), Saatsi (forthcoming), and Reutlinger (2013). My goal is to further elaborate and advance the CTE and to apply it to two novel examples of non-causal explanations that proponents of the CTE have not yet addressed.
I will start with reconstructing the CTE in a way that emphasizes the "common element" (Woodward 2003: 221) of causal and non-causal explanations -this common element, I conjecture, is not essentially tied to an interventionist approach to causation (I will return to this issue below). In this reconstruction I largely follow Woodward's (2003: 203) and Woodward and an explanation has two parts: first, a statement E about the explanandum phenomenon; second, an explanans consisting of generalizations G 1 , …, G n and auxiliary statements S 1 , …, S n . Auxiliary statements often are statements about initial or boundary conditions specifying the state of the explanandum system (as Hitchcock and Woodward highlight those statements typically assert that variables take a certain value). But the auxiliary statements may also comprise other kinds of statements useful for explanations (for instance, Nagelian bridge laws, symmetry assumptions, limit theorems, and other modeling assumptions).
According to the CTE, the relationship between the explanans and the explanandum is explanatory iff the following conditions are all satisfied:
1. Veridicality condition: G 1 , …, G m , S 1 , …, S n , and E are (approximately) true or, at least, well confirmed.
2. Implication condition: G 1 , …, G m and S 1 , …, S n logically entail E or a conditional probability P(E|S 1 , …, S n ) -where the conditional probability need not be 'high' in contrast to Hempel's covering-law account.
3. Dependency condition: G 1 , …, G m support at least one counterfactual of the form: had S 1 , …, S n been different than they actually are (in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations), then E or the conditional probability of E would have been different as well. 4 The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanationsboth kinds of explanation are explanatory because they reveal counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans.
Let me add two further remarks in order to sharpen the CTE:
First, reviving Hempel's (1965: 352) intuition that causal and non-causal explanations are based on different kinds of laws, one may distinguish between 4 I assume that a generalization supports counterfactuals only if the generalization is non-accidentally true or lawful. (Note that I use a broad notion of laws that includes non-strict ceteris paribus laws, such as Woodward and Hitckcock's own invariance account). However, my aim here is not to defend a particular view of laws. I want to suggest instead that the CTE is neutral with respect to alternative theories of non-accidental truth or lawhood, I which take to be a strength of the CTE. 2. The implication condition is met, since Euler's theorem together with the statement about the 'contingent fact' entail the explanandum statement.
3. The dependency condition is satisfied, because Euler's theorem supports the counterfactual "if all parts of Königsberg were connected to an even number of bridges, or if exactly two parts of town were connected to an odd number of bridges, then there would be an Euler path through Königsberg".
Therefore, I conclude that the CTE applies to Euler's explanation.
Renormalization Group Explanations
So-called renormalization group (RG, for short) explanations constitute another, technically more sophisticated, kind of non-causal explanation (see Batterman 2000 Batterman , 2002 . 6 RG explanations are intended to provide understanding of why microscopically different physical systems display the same macro-behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. For instance, near the critical temperature, the phenomenology of transitions of a fluid from a liquid to a vaporous phase, or of a metal from a magnetic to a demagnetized phase is (in some respects) the same, although liquids and metals are significantly different on the micro-level.
This 'sameness' or -to use a more technical term -'universality' of the macrobehavior is characterized by a critical exponent that takes the same value for microscopically very different systems (Batterman 2000: 125-126) . How do physicists explain the remarkable fact that there is universal macro-behavior?
For the sake of brevity, it is useful to understand the workings of RG explanations as consisting of three key explanatory elements: (1) Hamiltonians,
(2) RG transformations, and (3) the flow of Hamiltonians. There is a fourth element -the laws of statistical mechanics, including the partition functionwhich I will leave in the background, for sake of brevity (Norton 2012: 227; see Wilson 1983) . The exposition of these elements will be non-technical because the paper is concerned with a non-technical question (see Batterman [2000: 137-144] ; for a more detailed exposition see Fisher 1982 Fisher , 1998 and Wilson 1983 ).
Hamiltonians:
The Hamiltonian is a function characterizing, among other things, the energy of the interactions between the components of the system.
One characteristic of the Hamiltonian of a physical system undergoing phase transition (say, a heating pot of water undergoing a transition from a liquid to a gaseous phase) is that each component of such a system does not merely interact with its nearby neighbors but also with distant components; in fact, the correlation length diverges (and becomes infinite). Adopting Batterman's terminology, I call this complicated Hamiltonian of a system undergoing a phase transition the "initial" or "original" Hamiltonian.
Renormalization group transformations: Keeping track of the interactions
between all the components of a system undergoing a phase transition is -
given the large number of components and the diverging correlation length -6 I argue for the non-causal character of RG explanations in Reutlinger (2014).
In sum, the three elements of an RG explanation allow us to determine whether systems with different original Hamiltonians belong to the same "universality class" and are characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982: 87) .
Two systems belong to the same universality class, if reiterating RG transformations reveals that both systems "flow" to the same fixed point. Second, the conditions that the CTE requires to hold are also satisfied:
1. The veridicality condition is satisfied, because the explanandum statement (that there is universal behavior) and the explanans can -at least for present purposes -be considered as being (approximately) true or at least well confirmed. Due to space limits, I cannot discuss the role of idealizations However, the dependency condition of the CTE does not require that the explanandum depend on all possible changes in the intitial conditions.
Instead the condition merely requires that the explanandum counterfactually depend on some possible changes in the explanans. The latter claim receives support from RG theory, which (also) shows that and why some systems with different original Hamiltonians do not exhibit the same macro-behavior and in fact belong to different universality classes (Wilson 1983) . As Batterman (2000: 127) points out, RG explanations reveal that belonging to a particular universality class depends on features such as the symmetry properties of the order parameter and the spatial dimensionality of the physical system. Hence, if systems with H* and H -figuring in the counterfactual above -differ with respect to those features, then the counterfactual at issue seems to be true, according to RG theory. Therefore, the CTE successfully captures RG explanations.
Conclusion
A 'liberal consensus' has emerged in the recent philosophy of scientific explanation: there are causal and non-causal explanations. In order to deal with the liberal consensus, I have argued for the counterfactual theory of explanation (the CTE). According to the CTE, causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I have argued that the CTE is applicable to two paradigms of non-causal explanations: Euler's explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality. For this reason, I believe that the CTE is a promising monist approach that deserves more attention and discussion.
